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For many years with three different supreme leaders of the Democratic Republic of
North Korea (DPRK), United States Government (USG) efforts to deter, limit, minimize,
and abolish DPRK nuclear weapons development and production have all failed (1).
One might attribute failure to an inadequate rationale for allowing some governments
but not others to develop and produce such weapons; inadequate USG intelligence
collection, intelligence analysis, clandestine and covert intelligence operations, and
counterintelligence capabilities; inadequate USG will to employ suitable intelligence and
military capabilities; or a nonpartisan inadequacy in developing and implementing
national security policy.
But there’s a core psychological issue behind the failure as well. Many years of operant
conditioning research suggest only 4 main approaches to influencing any behavior (2).
In positive reinforcement one introduces a consequence—something experienced as
pleasurable—after a desired behavior that has the effect of increasing the probability
that the behavior will occur again. In negative reinforcement one introduces a
consequence after a desired behavior that has the effect of decreasing something
experienced as noxious by the behavior’s perpetrator. This will have the effect of as
well of increasing the probability that the behavior will occur again. In omission training
one introduces a consequence—removing something experienced as positive—after an
undesired behavior that has the effect of decreasing the probability the behavior will
occur again. And in punishment one introduces a consequence experienced as noxious
after an undesired behavior to decrease the probability of that behavior.
National security policy, thus, can be rescued by psychological research, and decision
makers can then go on to engage the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse. But there are
just a few nagging problems. First, there’s a circularity to the 4 main approaches
influencing behavior. Looking a priori for what will increase or decrease the probability
of a behavior a posteriori, when the likely candidates are those with an a posteriori not
an a priori track record, presumes different situations are the same, or similar enough.
This is the key vulnerability of inductive logic—coming up with a universal conclusion
based on finite, specific examples—that founds much of science, including
psychological science. Second, what is experienced as desired or undesired,
pleasurable or noxious, even meaningful or without substantive meaning, is often
enough not easy to identify for operant conditioners and their targets. Even if
identification were easy at one moment, matters change with time. This is the case for
initiators, targets, and observers of national security initiatives. Third, there are
problematics with predictability, punishment being the most researched example. Yes,
punishment-related learning may result in a lower probability of a specific behavior.
Punishment also may alternatively result in the target learning how better to hide
undesired behaviors. The target also may learn how to apply noxious consequences to
others with less power or even those with more power, if the target has nothing but the
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undesired behavior in its behavioral repertoire. And it turns out that punishment along
with negative reinforcement and omission training are difficult to apply consistently, with
the right timing, over extended periods of time. In addition, all 3 may lead to the target
picking up mixed messages, depending on what else the target perceives is happening
domestically, regionally, and globally at the hands of various others.
So although the nucleus of the atom has been split, the psychological nucleus of
denuclearization has proven too tough a nut to crack. Similar problems occur with the
two other most other common approaches to conditioning—classical conditioning and
vicarious conditioning (3). As with more sophisticated variants of behavioral economics,
approaches acknowledging the significant roles played by the irrational, illogical, and
the emotional in human nature may prove more successful. Some would say that the
negative attributes rightly or wrongly ascribed to the current leaders of the USG and the
DPRK may fit the bill.
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